2017 Remuneration policy summary

Remuneration policy review

Our first Remuneration policy was approved by our shareholders at our AGM on 7 May 2014. As required under the regulations, shareholders are being asked to approve a new Remuneration policy at our AGM on 4 May 2017 which it is intended will apply for the next three financial years.

During 2016, the Committee reviewed the Remuneration policy to ensure that the Policy continues to:
- Be aligned with best practice;
- Create shareholder value; and
- Drive the success of the company and the delivery of its business strategy.

In addition, changes to the policy have been made to:
- Further align remuneration arrangements across the senior layers of the organisation;
- Deliver an appropriately competitive package to attract, retain and motivate executive talent; and
- Simplify pay arrangements.

The Committee consulted with our largest shareholders in respect of the proposed changes and took shareholders’ feedback into account when finalising the revised Remuneration policy. The table below provides an overview of the main changes that are proposed in respect of the Remuneration policy.

The full Remuneration policy that shareholders are asked to approve is set out on pages 138 to 146.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remuneration element</th>
<th>Proposed changes to policy</th>
<th>Rationale for the change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory deferral of Annual bonus</td>
<td>Increased from 25% to 50% of any bonus earned.</td>
<td>Alignment with shareholders: Further aligns executives with the long-term interests of shareholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplification of the Annual bonus</td>
<td>Simplify and align structure for all Executive Directors.</td>
<td>Simplification: Consistent approach for all Executive Directors, that can be clearly communicated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce the level of pay-out for threshold performance to nil.</td>
<td>Pay for performance: Ensures that higher levels of bonus pay-out are only received for significant performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual bonus and Performance Share Plan (PSP) performance measures</td>
<td>Provide additional flexibility for the Committee to determine the performance measures used on an annual basis during the three year life of the Remuneration policy.</td>
<td>Flexibility: In the context of the appointment of the new CEO, it is considered appropriate to provide sufficient flexibility to ensure performance metrics chosen over the next three years will remain aligned with the key financial and strategic objectives of the company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Committee would consult with shareholders prior to changing the performance measures used.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTI opportunities</td>
<td>The matching element of the DABP has been removed.</td>
<td>Simplification: Going forward, the PSP will be the only long-term incentive plan that is used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The maximum LTI opportunity for the CEO will be reduced from 700% to 650% of salary.</td>
<td>Reduction in maximum opportunity: Total LTI opportunity for all Executive Directors has been reduced. In 2017, the award to the CEO will be below the maximum opportunity (550% of salary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share Ownership Requirements (SOR)</td>
<td>Formally include the shareholding guidelines as part of the Remuneration policy.</td>
<td>Alignment with shareholders: To provide further alignment with shareholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased SOR for CEO to 6.5x salary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Remuneration policy report

Future policy table

Subject to shareholder approval at the company’s AGM on 4 May 2017, the Remuneration Policy for each remuneration element will be as outlined in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>No material change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>No material change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td>No material change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Salary

**Purpose and link to strategy**
To provide a core reward for the role.

**Operation**
Individual’s role, experience, performance and independently sourced data for relevant comparator groups considered when determining salary levels.

Salary increases typically take effect in the first quarter of each year.

Salaries are normally paid in the currency of the Executive Director’s home country.

**Opportunity**
There is no formal maximum limit and, ordinarily, salary increases will be broadly in line with the average increases for the wider GSK workforce.

However, increases may be higher to reflect a change in the scope of the individual’s role, responsibilities or experience. Salary adjustments may also reflect wider market conditions in the geography in which the individual operates.

Details of current salary levels are set out in the Annual report on remuneration.

**Performance measures**
The overall performance of the individual is a key consideration when determining salary increases.

Benefits

**Purpose and link to strategy**
Levels are set to recruit and retain high calibre individuals to execute the business strategy.

**Operation**
Executive Directors are eligible to receive benefits in line with the policy for other employees which may vary by location. These include, but are not limited to, car allowances, healthcare, life assurance/death in service (where not provided as part of the individual’s pension arrangements), personal financial advice and contractual post-retirement benefits. In line with the policy for other employees, Executive Directors may be eligible to receive overseas relocation allowances and international transfer-related benefits when required. Executive Directors are also eligible to participate in all-employee share schemes (e.g. Share Save and Share Reward Plan), under which they are subject to the same terms as all other employees. In order to recognise the high business travel requirements of the role, Executive Directors are also entitled to car travel and may be accompanied by their spouse/partner on business trips. Other benefits include expenses incurred in the ordinary course of business, which are deemed to be taxable benefits on the individual.

Benefit provision is tailored to reflect market practice in the geography in which the Executive Director is based and different policies may apply if current or future Executive Directors are based in a different country.

**Opportunity**
There is no formal maximum limit as benefits costs can fluctuate depending on changes in provider cost and individual circumstances. Details of current benefits and costs are set out in the Annual report on remuneration.

**Performance measures**
None.

Pension

**Purpose and link to strategy**
Pension arrangements provide a competitive level of retirement income.

**Operation**
Pension arrangements are structured in accordance with the plans operated in the country in which the individual is likely to retire. Where the individual chooses not to become a member of the pension plan, cash in lieu of the relevant pension contribution is paid instead. Executive Directors in the UK are entitled either to join the defined contribution pension plan or to receive a cash payment in lieu of pension contribution.

Where an individual is a member of a GSK legacy defined benefit plan, a defined contribution plan or an alternative pension plan arrangement and is subsequently appointed to the Board, he or she may remain a member of that plan.

**Opportunity**
The policy for all current Executive Directors and new external recruits is:

**UK:**
- 20% of salary contribution to defined contribution plan and further 5% in matched contributions subject to any relevant cap and in line with implementation principles for other members of the plan; or
- 20% of salary cash payment in lieu of pension contribution.

**US:**
Eligible for the same benefits as other US senior executives:
- Cash Balance Pension Plan and Supplemental Cash Balance Pension Plan, including Executive Pension Credit, provide maximum contribution of 38% of base salary across all pension plans.
- GSK 401(k) plan (formerly the US Retirement Savings Plan) and the Executive Supplemental Savings Plan with core contributions of 2% of salary and bonus and matched contributions of 4% of salary and bonus.

**Global:**
- Eligible for appropriate equivalent arrangement not in excess of the US/UK arrangements.

**Performance measures**
None.
Annual bonus

**Purpose and link to strategy**
To incentivise and recognise execution of the business strategy on an annual basis.

Rewards the achievement of stretching annual financial and strategic business targets and delivery of personal objectives.

**Operation**
Financial, operational and business targets are set at the start of the year by the Committee and bonus levels are determined by the Committee based on performance against those targets.

Individual objectives are set at the start of the year by the Committee and performance against those objectives is assessed by the Committee.

Executive Directors are required to defer 50% of any bonus earned into shares, or ADS as appropriate, for three years.

Deferred bonus shares are eligible for dividend equivalents up to the date of vesting.

The Committee may apply judgement in making appropriate adjustments to bonus outcomes to ensure they reflect underlying business performance.

Clawback and/or malus provisions apply as described on page 140.

**Opportunity**
The maximum bonus opportunity for Executive Directors is 200% of salary. For threshold performance, the bonus pay-out will be nil.

For target performance, the bonus payout will be 50% of the maximum opportunity.

**Performance measures**
Based on a combination of financial targets and individual/strategic business targets, with the majority of the bonus assessed against the financial measures. The weighting between different measures will be determined each year according to business priorities.

Further details, including the measures to be used in the financial year, are provided in the Annual report on remuneration.

Selection of annual bonus measures

The annual bonus is designed to drive the achievement of GSK’s annual financial and strategic business targets and the delivery of personal objectives.

Performance Share Plan (PSP)

**Purpose and link to strategy**
To incentivise and recognise delivery of the longer term business priorities, financial growth and increases in shareholder value compared to other pharmaceutical companies.

In addition, to provide alignment with shareholder interests, a retention element, to encourage long-term shareholding and discourage excessive risk taking.

**Operation**
Conditional awards are made annually with vesting dependent on the achievement of performance conditions over three years and are subject to an additional two-year holding period.

Awards are eligible for dividend equivalents up to the date of vesting and release.

The Committee may adjust the formulaic vesting outcome (either up or down) to ensure that the overall outcome reflects underlying business performance over the vesting period.

Clawback and/or malus provisions apply as described on page 140.

**Opportunity**
The normal maximum award limits that may be granted under the PSP to an individual in any one year are set out in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of salary</th>
<th>CEO 650</th>
<th>CFO 400</th>
<th>Other Executive Directors 500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance measures</strong></td>
<td>Based on a combination of financial, share price related and strategic performance conditions which are aligned to the company’s strategic plan. Up to 30% of awards will vest at threshold performance. Further details, including the performance targets attached to the PSP in respect of each year, are provided in the Annual report on remuneration.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection of long-term incentive measures</strong></td>
<td>The Committee selects performance measures which focus Executive Directors’ long-term remuneration on the delivery of GSK’s key strategic priorities over the longer term. In addition to setting robust targets, the Committee has implemented a number of safeguards to ensure the targets are met in a sustainable way and performance reflects genuine achievement against targets and therefore represents the delivery of value for shareholders. For each performance measure, the impact of any acquisition or divestment will be quantified and adjusted for after the event.</td>
<td>Any major adjustment in the calculation of performance measures will be disclosed to shareholders on vesting. The Chairman of the Audit and Risk Committee and other members, who are also members of the Remuneration Committee, provide input on the Audit &amp; Risk Committee’s review of the Group’s performance and oversight of any risk factors relevant to remuneration decisions. Details of the rationale behind the performance measures selected and how they are calculated is set out in the Annual report on remuneration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the event of a ‘triggering event’ (e.g. significant misconduct by way of violation of regulation, law, or a significant GSK policy, such as the Code of Conduct), the company will have the ability to claw back up to three years’ annual and deferred bonuses as well as vested and unvested LTIs. In addition, if a participant in the new 2017 PSP or DABP, which shareholders are asked to approve at the 2017 AGM, is subject to an investigation, then the vesting of their awards may be delayed until the outcome of that investigation.

A separate Recoupment Committee has been established to investigate relevant claims of misconduct. The Recoupment Committee exercises this authority for the wider employee base. It comprises of senior executives with relevant oversight and appropriate experience, including the Senior Vice President, Global Ethics and Compliance, and the Senior Vice President & General Counsel.

In respect of each financial year, the Remuneration Committee will disclose whether it (or the Recoupment Committee) has exercised clawback or malus. Disclosure will only be made when the matter has been subject to public reports of misconduct, where it has been fully resolved, where it is legally permissible to disclose and where it can be made without unduly prejudicing the company and therefore shareholders.

Additionally, where there has been continuity of responsibility between initiation of an adverse event and its emergence as a problem, the adverse event should be taken into account in assessing annual bonus awards and LTI vesting levels in the year the problem is identified and for future periods. The Remuneration Committee (or Recoupment Committee) may make appropriate adjustments to individual annual bonuses as well as grant and vesting levels of LTI awards to reflect this.

Purpose
To incentivise and recognise delivery of longer term business priorities and to provide alignment with shareholder interests and encourage long-term shareholding.

Operation and maximum opportunity
For bonus payments up to and including the bonus in respect of 2016, Executive Directors were required to defer 25% of any bonus earned into shares for three years. They could also voluntarily defer up to an additional 25% of any bonus earned. These deferred shares were matched up to a maximum of 1:1 subject to the achievement of performance conditions over three years. Matching awards were conditional shares or nil-cost options and eligible for dividend equivalents.

Performance measures
Outstanding matching awards are subject to the same measures as awards made under the PSP in any given year. Further details of outstanding awards are provided on pages 122 and 135 of the Annual report on remuneration. No matching awards will be made under the DABP in respect of bonus from 2017 onwards.

Share Ownership Requirements
To align the interests of Executive Directors with those of shareholders, they are required to build and maintain significant holdings of shares in GSK over time. The requirements for each Executive Director are as follows:

| % salary | CEO 650 | Other Executive Directors 300 |

Executive Directors are also required to continue to satisfy these requirements for a minimum of 12 months following retirement from the company.

Clawback and malus
In the event of a ‘triggering event’ (e.g. significant misconduct by way of violation of regulation, law, or a significant GSK policy, such as the Code of Conduct), the company will have the ability to claw back up to three years’ annual and deferred bonuses as well as vested and unvested LTIs. In addition, if a participant in the new 2017 PSP or DABP, which shareholders are asked to approve at the 2017 AGM, is subject to an investigation, then the vesting of their awards may be delayed until the outcome of that investigation.

A separate Recoupment Committee has been established to investigate relevant claims of misconduct. The Recoupment Committee exercises this authority for the wider employee base. It comprises of senior executives with relevant oversight and appropriate experience, including the Senior Vice President, Global Ethics and Compliance, and the Senior Vice President & General Counsel.

In respect of each financial year, the Remuneration Committee will disclose whether it (or the Recoupment Committee) has exercised clawback or malus. Disclosure will only be made when the matter has been subject to public reports of misconduct, where it has been fully resolved, where it is legally permissible to disclose and where it can be made without unduly prejudicing the company and therefore shareholders.

Additionally, where there has been continuity of responsibility between initiation of an adverse event and its emergence as a problem, the adverse event should be taken into account in assessing annual bonus awards and LTI vesting levels in the year the problem is identified and for future periods. The Remuneration Committee (or Recoupment Committee) may make appropriate adjustments to individual annual bonuses as well as grant and vesting levels of LTI awards to reflect this.
The Committee determines the remuneration package of new Executive Directors on a case-by-case basis depending on the role, the market from which they will operate and their experience. Total remuneration levels will be set by reference to a relevant pay comparator group and, where appropriate, will allow for future development in the role.

It is expected that new Executive Directors will participate in short and long-term incentive plans on the same basis as existing directors. However, in exceptional circumstances, the Committee reserves the flexibility to set the incentive limit for a new Executive Director at up to an additional 50% of the existing limits.

The Committee retains this flexibility in recognition of the high levels of variable pay in GSK’s global pharmaceutical competitors. However, the Committee will only use this flexibility when it is considered to be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. Such arrangements will, where possible, be on a like-for-like basis with the forfeited remuneration terms. Arrangements will therefore vary depending on the plans and arrangements put in place by the previous employer and may be in the form of cash or shares and may or may not be subject to performance conditions. Explanations will be provided where payments are made as compensation for previous remuneration forfeited.

Pension arrangements for any external recruit as an Executive Director will be as set out in the Remuneration policy table on page 138.

Other benefits will be provided in line with the policy for existing Executive Directors.

Where required to meet business needs, relocation support will be provided in line with company policy.

For any internal appointments, entitlements under existing remuneration elements will continue, including pension entitlements and any outstanding awards. However, where not already the case, internal appointments will be required to move to Executive Director contractual terms, including termination provisions.

The Committee is mindful of the sensitivity relating to recruitment packages and, in particular, the ‘buying out’ of rights relating to previous employment. It will therefore seek to minimise such arrangements. However, in certain circumstances, to enable the recruitment of exceptional talent, the Committee may determine that such arrangements are in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. Such arrangements will, where possible, be on a like-for-like basis with the forfeited remuneration terms. Arrangements will therefore vary depending on the plans and arrangements put in place by the previous employer and may be in the form of cash or shares and may or may not be subject to performance conditions. Explanations will be provided where payments are made as compensation for previous remuneration forfeited.

The remuneration arrangements for any newly appointed Executive Director will be disclosed as soon as practicable after the appointment.

The following policy and principles apply to the roles of Chairman and Non-Executive Director.

**Chairman**

Fees will be set at a level that is competitive with those paid by other companies of equivalent size and complexity. Fees will be paid partly in shares.

**Non-Executive Directors**

Fee levels for new Non-Executive Directors will be set on the same basis as for existing Non-Executive Directors of the company. Subject to local laws and regulations, fees will be paid partly in shares.

In the event of a Non-Executive Director with a different role and responsibilities being appointed, fee levels will be benchmarked and set by reference to comparable roles in companies of equivalent size and complexity.
Remuneration policy report continued

Loss of office payment policy

The company does not have a policy of fixed term contracts. Generally, contracts for new appointments will expire in line with the applicable policy on retirement age, which since 2009 has been 65. Contracts for existing Executive Directors will expire on the dates shown on page 124.

Termination of employment

In the event that an Executive Director's employment with the company terminates, the following policies and payments will apply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element of Remuneration</th>
<th>Loss of office payment policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Termination payment</td>
<td>Termination by notice: 12 months' annual salary payable on termination by the company (pro-rated where part of the notice period is worked). No termination payment is made in respect of any part of a notice period that extends beyond the contract expiry date. A bonus element is not normally included in the termination payment. However, the terms of the contracts seek to balance commercial imperatives and best practice. Redundancy: As above, for termination by notice. In the UK, only statutory redundancy pay will apply. In the US, general severance policy does not apply. Retirement, death and ill-health, injury or disability: No termination payment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTI awards</td>
<td>PSP and DABP matching awards are governed by the plan rules as approved by shareholders. For awards made prior to the approval of the 2017 PSP and DABP rules, the following provisions will normally apply: Termination by notice: Unvested awards will lapse. Redundancy and retirement: Generally, awards will continue to vest over the original timescales, subject to the original performance conditions. Awards made in the last 12 months are forfeited. Death, ill-health, injury, disability or any other reason: Generally, performance will be assessed following the end of the financial year in which cessation of employment occurs and awards will vest up to 12 months following cessation. Awards may be pro-rated for time. For awards made under the approved rules of the 2017 PSP, the following provisions will normally apply: Termination by notice: Unvested awards will lapse. Redundancy, retirement, death, ill-health, injury, disability or any other reason: Generally, awards will continue to vest over the original timescales subject to performance and pro-rated for time. In the event of a change of control, PSP and DABP matching awards will vest, taking into account performance to date and normally taking into account the proportion of the performance period that has elapsed. Alternatively, the awards may be exchanged for new awards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual bonus</td>
<td>Termination by notice by individual: If an individual serves notice and the termination date falls before 31 December, the bonus is forfeited. Termination by notice by the company, redundancy, retirement, death, ill-health, injury or disability: If the termination date falls during the financial year, eligible for pro-rated on-target bonus (if employed on 31 December, bonus payable based on actual results).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DABP deferred bonus awards</td>
<td>DABP deferred bonus awards are governed by the plan rules as approved by shareholders. For awards made prior to the approval of the 2017 DABP rules, the following provisions will normally apply: Termination by notice: Awards will vest in full on the date of termination or original vesting date as determined at the date of grant. Redundancy, retirement, death, ill-health, injury, disability or any other reason: Generally, awards will vest in full on the original vesting date. For awards made under the approved rules of the 2017 DABP, the following provisions will normally apply: Termination for gross misconduct: Generally, unvested awards will lapse. Any other reason: Generally, awards will vest in full on the original vesting date. In the event of a change of control, awards will vest or may be exchanged for new awards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Generally, benefits will continue to apply until the termination date. The Committee may make payments in connection with an existing legal obligation or in respect of any claim related to the cessation of employment. This may include fees for outplacement assistance, legal and/or professional advice. Termination by notice by the company and retirement (US executives): In line with the policy applicable to US senior executives, the Chairman, Global Vaccines may become eligible, at a future date, to receive continuing medical and dental insurance after termination/retirement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Termination by mutual agreement

In certain circumstances, it can be in the best interests of the company for the Board to manage proactively succession planning and the development of the senior talent pipeline. In such circumstances, the Board may therefore agree that an Executive’s departure will be by mutual agreement. In order for this to apply, the Committee will need to be satisfied that the Executive has demonstrated performance in line with expectations, where required they should have contributed to an orderly succession, and they should have completed at least 20 years’ service with the Group on the termination date. In the case of an Executive Director, they would then be treated as a ‘good leaver’ for the purposes of GSK’s long-term incentive plans. If the termination date falls during the financial year, they would be eligible for a pro-rated on-target bonus and if they are employed on 31 December, the bonus payable would be based on actual results.
The Committee does not anticipate the exercise of discretion provided by the PSP and DABP plan rules in respect of termination payments in a manner which would benefit an Executive Director. However, there may be unforeseen circumstances where this is in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. Where it is necessary to exercise discretion, explanations will be provided.

Where an Executive Director leaves the company, the Committee will carry out an assessment of the individual’s performance and conduct over the time in role. If it is determined that the individual’s performance or conduct was contrary to the legitimate expectations of the company, the Committee reserves the right to apply appropriate mechanisms such as clawback or reduction or lapsing of outstanding incentive awards (malus), to ensure that any termination payments are in the best interests of the company and its shareholders (see page 140).

## Differences between remuneration policy for Executive Directors and other employees

When setting remuneration levels for the Executive Directors, the Committee considers the prevailing market conditions, the competitive environment (through comparison with the remuneration of executives at companies of similar size, complexity and international reach) and the positioning and relativities of pay and employment conditions across the broader GSK workforce.

In particular, the Committee considers the range of base salary rises for the workforces of those parts of GSK where the Executive Directors are employed. This is considered to be the most relevant comparison as these populations reflect most closely the economic environments encountered by the individuals.

The same principles apply to the Remuneration policy for Executive Directors and other employees although the remuneration offered to Executive Directors under this policy has a stronger emphasis on performance-related pay than that offered to other employees of the Group.

- Salary and benefits (including pension) are tailored to the local market.
- The annual bonus plan applies to the wider employee population and is based on business and individual performance.
- A combination of performance-related and restricted share plans apply to the wider employee population.
- All-employee share plans are available to employees in the UK, including the HM Revenue & Customs approved UK Share Save and Share Reward Plans.

While employees are not formally consulted in respect of the Remuneration policy, the company conducts regular employee surveys which include feedback on remuneration matters.

In the wider organisation, we have aligned our performance and reward systems with our values and since 2014, our performance system formally evaluates employees on both ‘what’ they need to do and ‘how’ they do it. Also, for our most senior people we dis-incentivise unethical working practices using a clawback mechanism that allows us to recover performance-related pay.
The charts opposite provide illustrations of the future total remuneration for each of the Executive Directors in respect of the remuneration opportunity granted to each of them in 2017 under the policy. A range of potential outcomes is provided for each Executive Director and the underlying assumptions are set out below.

**All scenarios:**
- 2017 base salary has been used.
- 2016 benefits and pension figures have been used for the CFO, i.e. based on actual amounts received in 2016 in respect of the ongoing policy. As the new CEO and President, R&D were not in role during 2016, the benefits value for each is based on the value of benefits (excluding pensions) provided in 2016 to the current CEO and CFO respectively.
- The amounts shown under value of PSP awards are based on the relevant multiples for 2017. They do not include amounts in respect of dividends reinvested and do not factor in changes to share price over the vesting period.

**Fixed:**
- None of the pay for performance (annual bonus and PSP) would be payable.

**Expected:**
- For the annual bonus, it is assumed that target performance is achieved.
- For the PSP awards, threshold levels of vesting are assumed.

**Maximum:**
- It is assumed that the annual bonus would be payable at the maximum level and that the awards under the PSP would vest in full.
## Non-Executive Director remuneration policy 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Purpose and link to strategy</th>
<th>Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Chairman's fees** | To provide an inclusive flat fee that is competitive with those paid by other companies of equivalent size and complexity subject to the limits contained in GSK's Articles of Association. | There is no formal maximum. However, fees are reviewed annually and set by reference to a review of the Chairman’s performance and independently sourced market data.  
The Committee is responsible for evaluating and making recommendations to the Board on the fees payable to the Chairman. The Chairman does not participate in discussions in respect of his fees.  
Fees can be paid in a combination of cash and/or GSK shares or ADS via the Non-Executive Directors’ Share Allocation Plan. |
| **Basic fees**    | As above                                                                                       | As with the Chairman, fees are reviewed annually and set by reference to independently sourced data.  
The Chairman and CEO are responsible for evaluating and making recommendations to the Board on the fees payable to the company's Non-Executive Directors.  
A minimum of 25% is delivered in the form of GSK shares or ADS. Using the Non-Executive Directors’ Share Allocation Plan which delivers the shares or ADS to the Non-Executive Director following retirement from the Board. |
| **Supplemental fees** | To compensate Non-Executive Directors (other than the Chairman) for taking on additional Board responsibilities or undertaking intercontinental travel. | Additional fees for Committee Chairmen, the Senior Independent Non-Executive Director, Science and Medical Experts and intercontinental travel. |
| **Benefits**      | To facilitate execution of responsibilities and duties required by the role.                   | Travel and subsistence costs for Non-Executive Directors are incurred in the normal course of business in relation to meetings on Board and Committee matters and other GSK-hosted events. For overseas-based Non-Executive Directors, this includes travel to meetings in the UK. In the event it is necessary for business purposes, whilst not normal practice, Non-Executive Directors may be accompanied by their spouse or partner to these meetings or events. The costs associated with the above are all met by the company and, in some instances, they are deemed to be taxable and therefore treated as benefits for the Non-Executive Director. |
Remuneration policy report continued

Operation and scope of Remuneration policy

The proposed Remuneration policy (Policy) is set out on pages 138 to 146 of the 2016 Annual Report and it is intended that the Policy for GSK’s Executive and Non-Executive Directors will apply from the close of the company’s Annual General Meeting on 4 May 2017 after it has been submitted by the Committee for approval by shareholders.

The Committee has written this Policy principally in relation to the remuneration arrangements for the Executive Directors, whilst taking into account the possible recruitment of a replacement or an additional Executive Director during the operation of this Policy. The Committee intends this Policy to operate for the period set out above in its entirety. However, it may after due consideration, seek to change the Policy during this period, but only if it believes it is appropriate to do so for the long-term success of the company, after consultation with shareholders and having sought shareholder approval at a general meeting.

The Committee reserves the right to make any remuneration payments and/or payments for loss of office (including exercising any discretions available to it in connection with such payments) notwithstanding that they are not in line with the Policy set out above where the terms of the payment were agreed:

(i) before the AGM on 7 May 2014 (the date the company’s first shareholder-approved Directors’ Remuneration Policy came into effect);
(ii) before the Policy set out above came into effect, provided that the terms of the payment were consistent with the shareholder-approved Remuneration policy in force at the time they were agreed; or
(iii) at a time when the relevant individual was not a Director of the company and, in the opinion of the Committee, the payment was not in consideration for the individual becoming a Director of the company. For these purposes “payments” includes the Committee satisfying awards of variable remuneration and, in relation to an award over shares or ADS, the terms of the payment are “agreed” at the time the award is granted.

Performance Share Plan and Deferred Annual Bonus Plan awards are subject to the terms of the relevant plan rules under which the award has been granted. The Committee may adjust or amend awards only in accordance with the provisions of the plan rules. This includes making adjustments to reflect one-off corporate events, such as a change in the company’s capital structure.

The Committee may also make minor amendments to the Policy set out in this report (for regulatory, exchange control, tax or administrative purposes or to take account of a change in legislation) without obtaining shareholder approval for such amendments.

Statement of consideration of shareholder views

The Committee engages in regular dialogue with shareholders and holds annual meetings with GSK’s largest investors to discuss and take feedback on its Remuneration Policy and governance matters. The annual meetings were held in December 2016, at which Urs Rohner, the Committee Chairman, shared updates on remuneration matters in the last 12 months and proposals for 2017 onwards. Further shareholder consultations were carried out in February and March 2017 by the Committee Chairman on the proposed Remuneration policy. The Committee took into account the feedback from shareholders in determining the Policy which shareholders are being asked to approve at the AGM on 4 May 2017.

Basis of preparation

The Directors’ Remuneration Report has been prepared in accordance with the Companies Act 2006 and The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 2013 (the Regulations). In accordance with the Regulations, the following parts of the Annual Report on Remuneration are subject to audit: total remuneration figures for Executive Directors including further details for each element of remuneration (salary, benefits, pension, annual bonus and long-term incentive awards); Non-Executive Directors’ fees and emoluments received in the year; Directors’ interests in shares, including interests in GSK share plans; payments to past Directors; payments for loss of office; and share ownership requirements and holdings, for which the opinion thereon is expressed on page 156. The remaining sections of the Directors’ Remuneration Report are not subject to audit nor are the pages referred to from within the audited sections.

The Directors’ Remuneration Report has been approved by the Board of Directors and signed on its behalf by

Urs Rohner
Remuneration Committee Chairman
13 March 2017